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Abstract:  
We partnered with Alaska’s Pick.Click.Give. Charitable Contributions Program to implement a 
statewide natural field experiment with 540,000 Alaskans designed to explore whether targeted 
appeals emphasizing donor benefits through warm glow impact donations. Results highlight the 
relative import of appeals to self. Individuals who received such an appeal were 4.5 percent more 
likely to give and gave 20 percent more than counterparts in the control group. Yet, a message that 
instead appealed to recipient benefits had no effect on average donations relative to the control 
group. We also find evidence of long-run effects of warm glow appeals in the subsequent year.  
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I. Introduction 
Charitable organizations play an important role in modern economies, providing invaluable public 
goods and employment opportunities for millions nationwide. As far back as the mid-1800s, the 
sector has recognized the importance that private individuals play in financing their operations. In 
the United States today there are more than 1.5 million registered nonprofit organizations that 
receive cash contributions exceeding two percent of GDP annually. In fact, growth of the sector 
has outperformed the S&P 500 over the past several decades (List, 2011). Notwithstanding, experts 
predict that the sector will grow in importance as aging populations and devolutionary trends in 
government cause increased reliance on the goods and services of nonprofits.  
Not surprisingly, these challenges have prompted a tremendous amount of research on the 
primitives of the economics of charity and the relationship between charities and potential donors. 
Much of this work has focused on the impact of different fund-raising techniques and the 
associated impact on both the number of donors and overall contribution levels.1 Our study builds 
on this body of work and takes as inspiration the lot of studies that show the importance of warm 
glow (see, e.g., Andreoni, 1995; Crumpler and Grossman, 2008; Null, 2011; Tonin and 
Vlassopoulos, 2010; Imas, 2014; Tonin and Vlassopoulos, 2014; Singh et al., 2019).2  
In this spirit, we designed a natural field experiment embedded within the state of Alaska’s 
Permanent Fund Dividend Charitable Contributions Program or Pick.Click.Give. 
(www.pickclickgive.org).3 As part of the 2014 fundraising campaign, we randomly allocated the 
approximate 290,000 households in the state into either a control group or one of two treatment 
groups that received a postcard promoting Pick.Click.Give. Both postcards included a normative 
appeal but differed in whether the message highlighted either benefits to self (“Warm Your Heart”) 
or benefits to others (“Make Alaska Better for Everyone”). The slogans were designed to reflect 
                                                          
1 Such studies cover topics including: (i) matching gifts and rebates (Chen et al., 2006; Eckel and Grossman, 2006; 
Karlan and List, 2007; Meier, 2007; Huck and Rasul, 2011; Scharf and Smith, 2014), (ii) charitable auctions and 
lotteries (Morgan, 2000; Goeree et al., 2005; Landry et al., 2006; Carpenter et al., 2008; Elfenbein and McManus, 
2010), (iii) social comparisons (Frey and Meier, 2004; Shang and Croson, 2009), (iv) thank you gifts (Falk, 2007; 
Alpizar et al., 2008; Eckel et al., 2014), (v) peer solicitations (Meer, 2011; Castillo et al., 2014; Smith et al., 2013), 
and (vi) seed money announcements (Andreoni, 1998; List and Lucking-Reiley, 2002; Vesterlund, 2003; Potters et 
al., 2007; Bracha et al., 2011). 
2 A related body of work in marketing explores the effectiveness of solicitation appeals highlighting benefits to self 
(see, e.g., Brunel and Nelson, 2000; Peloza and White, 2009; Feiler et al., 2012; Baek et al., 2019).   
3 Pick.Click.Give. was established in 2009 as a way for Alaskans to share some of their annual Permanent Fund 
Dividend (PFD) with eligible nonprofits throughout the state. Donors simultaneously choose the amount to give and 
to which charities. 
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the two main motives for charitable giving – concerns for the benefits to self (impure altruism or 
“warm glow”) and concerns for the benefits to others (pure altruism) - and provide a means to 
disentangle their relative importance.4 
Postcards were mailed during the last week of December 2013 and we received information 
on donations for each of the more than 540,000 individuals who registered for their 2014 
Permanent Fund Dividend online. We observe donations in excess of $3.1 million coming from 
more than 26,000 unique individuals. To explore whether our messages influenced long-run 
patterns of giving, we augment our data to include information on contributions through 
Pick.Click.Give. in 2015.  
Results from our experiment highlight the relative importance of benefits to self on 
donation decisions. Individuals who received the “Warm Your Heart” message were 
approximately 4.5 percent more likely to give and their contributions were 20 percent larger than 
in the control group. Messages that highlighted the benefit to others increased the propensity to 
give, but had no effect on average donation size. Interestingly, similar data patterns are observed 
for both warm-list households (those who contributed through Pick.Click.Give. in 2013) and cold-
list counterparts (who did not give in 2013).  Treatment effects on both the propensity to give and 
on average donation size were, however, more pronounced amongst cold-list which suggests that 
normative appeals are an effective way to attract new donors.  
Exploring other heterogeneities, we find that women and those age 50 and over were more 
likely to give and provided larger average gifts than others. However, conditional on giving, men 
provided larger gifts. Such differences share similarities to data from List (2004). Moreover, these 
data patterns suggest that the distribution of altruism for women was less disperse than the 
distribution for men; a pattern identified by structural estimates in Della Vigna et al. (2013). 
Finally, as in Landry et al. (2010), we find that prior donors were more likely to give and provided 
larger average gifts than cold-list counterparts.  
Given past work showing the relative impermanence of behavioral interventions (e.g., 
Gneezy and List, 2006; Landry et al., 2010; Ferraro and Price, 2013; Allcott and Rogers, 2014) 
and the importance charitable organizations place on building a long-term relationship with 
                                                          
4 Although the warm-glow model (Andreoni, 1989; 1990) is the canonical example, other models that focus on the 
relative importance of benefits to self include work on social pressures (e.g., Della Vigna et al., 2012; Knutsson et al., 
2013; Andreoni et al., 2017) and social identity (Benjamin et al., 2010; Kessler and Milkman, 2014). 
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donors, it is important to explore whether the effects of our targeted messages are sustained across 
campaigns and impacted long-run patterns of giving. To shed insights into the long-run impacts, 
we examine whether treatment assignment in 2014 impacted contributions through 
Pick.Click.Give. during the 2015 campaign. Results for this analysis suggest that our intervention 
impacted long-run patterns of giving—those who received the “Warm Your Heart” message were 
more likely to give and provided larger contributions in the subsequent 2015 campaign than others. 
Yet, for warm-list donors, the effectiveness of our “nudge” waned over time and the impact on 
giving in the 2015 campaign was significantly less pronounced than what was observed during the 
2014 campaign. For cold-list donors, treatment effects were more persistent and suggest that 
receiving the benefits to self message had long-lasting effects.  
Our paper contributes to several different literatures. First, our paper contributes to a 
growing body of work incorporating insights from behavioral economics such as the power of 
defaults (Goswami and Urminsky, 2016; Altmann et al., 2019) or time inconsistency (Breman, 
2011; Andreoni and Serra-Garcia, 2016) into solicitation appeals. However, our paper extends the 
previous work along two dimensions. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to explore the 
impact of targeted messages and normative appeals on charitable giving in a natural field 
experiment. In this regard, our paper shares similarity with a body of work exploring the impact 
of social information on contributions to a charity or online message board (e.g., Frey and Meier, 
2004; Croson and Shang, 2009; Shang and Croson, 2009; Chen et al., 2010; Smith et al., 2013; 
Chen et al., 2017; Gallus, 2017). Moreover, prior work has focused on behavior in the context of 
a fund-raising drive to explore how various strategies affect giving to the associated charitable 
cause. Our study, in contrast, explores behavior in the context of a government-sponsored program 
designed to encourage giving to a range of eligible charitable organizations and how our messages 
impacted aggregate patterns of giving through this program.  
Second, our paper contributes to a body of research in marketing and social psychology 
exploring the impact of self- and other-benefit appeals on charitable donations (e.g., Fisher et al., 
2008; White and Peloza, 2009; Feiler et al., 2012; Baek et al., 2019).  However, much of this 
literature relies upon laboratory experiments and hypothetical decisions such as statements about 
one’s intention to/likelihood of donating to a given cause.  Moreover, the aim of this literature is 
to explore whether factors such as self-image concerns, public observability, or social exclusion 
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moderate the effectiveness of such appeals.  Our paper extends this literature by exploring the 
impact of such appeals on both contemporaneous and long-run patterns of giving.      
Third, our findings contribute to the literature on social norms and the use of normative 
appeals as a means to promote behavioral change. To date, this literature has largely focused on 
using such appeals to influence outcomes such as retirement savings and the use of credit (Beshears 
et al., 2015; Seira et al., 2017), tax compliance (Fellner et al., 2013; Hallsworth et al., 2017), traffic 
violations (Chen et al., 2017), or the amount of water or energy used by residential households 
(Allcott, 2011; Costa and Kahn, 2013; Ferraro and Price, 2013; Allcott and Rogers, 2014; Brent et 
al., 2015; Ito et al., 2018). In our study, however, we concentrate on participation in a government-
sponsored program and subsequent patterns of charitable giving through this program. In this 
regard, our study is closest in spirit to an emerging literature that explores the use of social norms 
to induce participation in in-home energy audits as a means to promote the adoption of improved 
technologies (Hahn et al., 2016; Holladay et al., 2019; Allcott and Greenstone, 2017). 
Fourth, our paper contributes to a literature exploring the economic impacts of permanent 
cash transfers such as Alaska’s Permanent Fund Dividend payments. To date, this literature has 
focused on how receipt of the PFD payments impact outcomes such as intertemporal patterns of 
consumption (Hsieh, 2003; Kueng, 2015), short-term mortality (Evans and Moore, 2011), 
aggregate employment (Jones and Marinescu, 2018), or crime (Watson, Guettabi, and Reimer, 
2019). We extend this literature by exploring how the PFD payments influence charitable giving 
and the private provision of public goods. 
Finally, our paper contributes to a literature that sets forth to identify the underlying 
motives for charitable giving. Broadly speaking, such studies focus on two main drivers of 
behavior – concerns for the benefits to self or concerns for the benefits to others – and attempt to 
disentangle the motives by testing the extent to which donations by others are a substitute for one’s 
own gifts. For example, there is a rich body of work that relies upon variation in the gifts of 
others/government funding to test for crowding (e.g., Kingma, 1989; Andreoni, 1993; Payne, 
1998; Andreoni and Payne, 2003, 2011; Eckel et al., 2005; Crumpler and Grossman, 2008; 
Andreoni et al., 2104; Ottoni-Wilhelm et al., 2017). Although such an approach tests the defining 
characteristic of the pure altruism model (complete crowding), identification requires strong 
assumptions regarding fund-raising effort and what is known by potential donors regarding the 
gifts of others. Our study provides an alternate approach to disentangle the relative importance of 
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benefits to self and benefits to others – the use of targeted messages that make salient a given 
motive.  
 
II. Alaska’s Permanent Fund and Pick.Click.Give. 
Every fall, Alaskans receive an annual payment known as the Permanent Fund Dividend 
(PFD), which represents their share of the earnings the state receives from investing revenues from 
oil production. The source of these payments, the Alaska Permanent Fund, is a sovereign wealth 
fund created by an amendment to the state constitution in 1976 as a way to share returns from the 
extraction of the state’s oil resources with future generations. In 2014, the fund had around $50 
billion in assets that were invested in a diverse portfolio managed by an independent state agency 
charged with maximizing long-term income.5  
 Any individual (including children) who was a resident of Alaska for the entire calendar 
year prior, and who declares an intent to remain in the state indefinitely, is eligible to receive a 
dividend. The registration period begins every January 1st and continues through the final day of 
March with distribution of the PFD occurring in early October. Potential recipients must register 
for the Permanent Fund on an annual basis to confirm their eligibility.  
 The total amount distributed each year is based on a five-year average of earnings for the 
Permanent Fund. The total amount is then divided equally amongst all eligible recipients.6 The 
first PFD for $1000 was issued in 1982. Since then, the annual distributions have varied annually 
with the per person payments ranging from a low of $331.29 in 1984 to a high of $2,072 in 2015; 
see Figure 1.  
Although the PFD arrives as a lump-sum payment, Hsieh (2003) found no evidence that 
consumption patterns are sensitive to PFD disbursements suggesting that the payments are 
integrated into disposable income. In part, this reflects that Alaskans have a rough idea of what the 
upcoming dividend payments will be when the application period opens each January. Local media 
                                                          
5 See http://www.apfc.org for more information on the Permanent Fund. 
6 The use of a five year average to determine disbursements is designed to (i) reduce fluctuations in the annual dividend 
payments due to volatility in the stock market and (ii) reduce incentives to manage funds for short-term gains 
(Goldsmith, 2010). 
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typically provide estimates of the coming year’s PFD amount, providing individuals information 
that can be used to integrate the dividend into the household budget.7 
A more recent body of work calls into question the assumption that PFD disbursements are 
integrated into disposable income. For example, Kueng (2018) provides evidence that variations 
in PFD disbursements have a significant impact on the purchase of nondurable goods. Similarly, 
Jones and Marinescu (2018) provide evidence that while PFD disbursements have no impact on 
aggregate employment, there are sizeable effects of the disbursements on employment and part-
time work in the non-tradeable sector; a pattern of results they note is consistent with PFD 
disbursements leading to consumption increases that stimulate labor demand. Given this evidence, 
it is interesting to examine whether, and to what extent, one can stimulate individuals to share PFD 
disbursements with nonprofits in the state.  
 
The Permanent Fund Charitable Contributions Program: Pick.Click.Give. 
Historically, nonprofits around the state of Alaska were able to finance their operations 
largely through corporate largesse and government earmarks. Faced with the national economic 
downturn and declining state oil revenues, Alaskan nonprofits have had to develop a new model 
of funding that includes increased focus on private provision.8 To facilitate this change, the state 
of Alaska introduced the Permanent Fund Charitable Contributions Program (better known as 
Pick.Click.Give.) in 2009 as a way to promote individual giving to nonprofits throughout the state. 
The program was established as a three-year pilot project after which it was incorporated into the 
Permanent Fund Dividend program. Pick.Click.Give. was managed by the Rasmuson Foundation 
until 2015 when management of the program was turned over to the Alaska Community 
Foundation. At that time, the state legislature instituted a coordination fee whereby 7 percent of 
all donations would be used to cover the costs of administering the program.  
Pick.Click.Give. allows individuals to voluntarily donate any portion of their Permanent 
Fund Dividend to eligible nonprofits of their choice. The eligibility requirements for nonprofit 
                                                          
7 For example, in September 2013, the Anchorage Daily News projected an approximately $1800 dividend for 2014 
(the year of our study) which was not much different than the $1884 dividend actually paid in October 2014. 
http://www.adn.com/article/20130927/bigger-dividend-checks-likely-permanent-fund-swells-43-billion-2013 
8 According to data from the Urban Institute, Alaska has one of the lowest rates of giving of any state in the nation. 
For example, the average contribution in 2013 for a household that itemized their tax return was $869 or approximately 
1.4% of their overall income – a figure that ranked 47th nationwide.  
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/77671/2000608-Profiles-of-Individual-Charitable-
Contributions-by-State-2013.pdf 
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organizations include that (i) the organization was qualified as an exempt 501(c)(3) organization 
for at least two years prior to the application, (ii) the organization is directed by a voluntary board 
of directors or an advisory board for which a majority of the members are residents of the state, 
and (iii) the organization receives at least $100K or five percent of its total annual receipts from 
charitable contributions. Eligible organizations provide a diverse array of services that span seven 
main sectors; (i) youth services and education, (ii) emergency response for victims of crime, (iii) 
humanitarian services, (iv) animal shelters and zoos, (v) arts and culture, (vi) health services, and 
(vii) community based services and organizations. In 2014, a total of 512 nonprofit organizations 
from more than 50 communities around Alaska registered and received contributions through 
Pick.Click.Give.9 
To be eligible to give through Pick.Click.Give, individuals must register for the Permanent 
Fund Dividend online.10 Once the online PFD application is complete, individuals are provided a 
link that guides them to a website where they can pledge donations through Pick.Click.Give. 
Contributions made through Pick.Click.Give. are deducted from the individual’s PFD return and 
sent directly to the nonprofit by the Permanent Fund Division.  
The minimum allowable donation is $25, and increases in $25 increments up to the full 
amount of the dividend payment. Since the exact amount of the PFD is not known at the time of 
registration, donors who select multiple organizations to support must prioritize them. If total 
pledges exceed the PFD, donations are processed in order of priority until the PFD is exhausted. 
Although the PFD registration closes at the end of March, individuals can update their pledges 
through Pick.Click.Give. through the end of August, at which time the pledge becomes a binding 
commitment. Contributions made through the program are tax deductible and donors have the 
option, when making their pledge, to check a box authorizing the state to send their name and 
contact information to the organizations they have chosen to support.  
 Table 1 provides information on both the rate of participation and aggregate donations for 
the first five years of the program (2009 through 2013). As noted in the table, both participation 
rates and aggregate donations have grown steadily over time. For example, whereas aggregate 
contributions in 2009 totaled $400,000, this figure increased more than five-fold by 2013, when 
                                                          
9 This represents an approximate 8.5 percent increase in the number of eligible recipients relative to the 2013 campaign 
and an approximate 39 percent increase in the number of eligible recipients since the program’s inception in 2009.  
10 In 2014, the year of our study, approximately 83 percent of all individuals who registered for the PFD did so online 
and were thus eligible to give through Pick.Click.Give.  
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aggregate contributions totaled more than $2.3 million. During the first five years of the program 
(2009-2013), Alaskan’s contributed nearly $6.8 million to nonprofits throughout the state, which 
accounts for nearly one percent of overall contributions to nonprofit organizations throughout the 
state over this time period.11 
 
III. Experimental Design and Results 
As aforementioned, there is a vibrant literature that explores the demand side of charitable 
fundraising (see, e.g., Andreoni, 1995; List and Lucking-Reiley, 2002; Null, 2011; Ottoni-
Whilhelm, 2017; Singh et., 2019). Our goal is to extend this work to the Pick.Click.Give. 
environment by leveraging the spirit of warm glow to examine whether targeted messages and 
normative appeals affect donor behavior in a manner that is consonant with warm glow. To do so, 
we designed a natural field experiment as part of the 2014 Pick.Click.Give. marketing campaign. 
We randomly assigned every household in Alaska into either a control group (no postcard) or one 
of two treatment groups that received a postcard that included a normative slogan designed to 
highlight one of two main motivations for charitable giving – concerns for the benefits to self 
(impure altruism or “warm-glow”) or concerns for the benefits to others (pure altruism).12 As state 
law prohibited the Permanent Fund Division from providing address-level data, randomization 
occurred at the zip code level.  
 In each treatment, households in pre-determined zip codes throughout the state of Alaska 
were sent a postcard during the final week of December 2013. Importantly, every household within 
a treatment zip code was mailed the assigned a postcard (see Figures 2 and 3). All postcards 
contained information about Pick.Click.Give. and urged the recipient to share their Permanent 
Fund Dividend. In addition, the front of each postcard contained a picture of either a heart or an 
outline of the state of Alaska within which was written a corresponding message – “Warm your 
heart. Share your PFD” or “Make Alaska better for everyone. Share your PFD”. These same 
appeals were printed on the back of the postcard along with a montage showing pictures of various 
Alaska residents.  
                                                          
11 Data on charitable giving in Alaska comes from a report by the Urban Institute profiling charitable giving across 
different states, see, https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/77671/2000608-Profiles-of-Individual-
Charitable-Contributions-by-State-2013.pdf  
12 In this regard, our design and messages share similarity with work in marketing and social psychology exploring 
the relative impact of self-benefit and other-benefit messages on altruism and pro-social behavior (e.g., White and 
Peloza, 2009; Feiler et al., 2012; Baek et al., 2019).   
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 Table 2 summarizes our experimental design and corresponding sample size for each 
treatment. As noted Panel B, our control group included data for 169,441 individuals living in one 
of 89 distinct zip codes around the state. The benefits to others (“Make Alaska better for 
everyone”) treatment included data for 187,468 individuals residing in one of 90 distinct zip codes 
around the state. The benefits to self (“Warm your heart”) treatment included data for 183,215 
individuals residing in one of 89 distinct zip codes around the state.  
 Figure 4 provides a map of Alaska and shows the spatial distribution of our various 
treatment groups throughout the state. Anchorage, Juneau, Fairbanks, and Kodiak Island had 
multiple zip codes; each of the other communities only had a single zip code and were thus exposed 
to a single treatment condition. Figure 5 shows the spatial distribution of treatments for these 
statistical areas. 
 Before proceeding to the results section, we should highlight a few important design issues. 
First and foremost, privacy laws prohibited the Permanent Fund Division from releasing address-
level data for individuals that registered for the Permanent Fund Dividend. We were thus forced 
to randomize at the zip code level which was the finest geographic indicator in the data. Second, 
data for the experiment was provided by the Permanent Fund Division and includes a unique ID 
code for every person who registered for a PFD along with (i) the date they registered for the PFD, 
(ii) the filing method – mail or electronic, (iii) the name of any charity supported along with the 
associated pledge amount, (iv) the age and gender of the individual, and (v) zip codes associated 
with the individual’s home residence and mailing address. We used data from 2013 to assign zip 
codes to treatments and ensure balance along observable dimensions. 
Third, only those individuals who registered for the PFD online were eligible to donate 
through Pick.Click.Give. We thus restrict our sample to the subset of individuals (83.3% in 2014) 
who registered online. Fourth, households were assigned to treatment based on the zip from their 
mailing address. For about 82% of the sample, the home and mailing zips are the same. However, 
as college students, Olympic athletes and active duty military are eligible for the PFD, we observe 
a small fraction of individuals for whom these zips do not match. In addition, people with post 
office boxes usually have different mailing and physical addresses. Finally, we cannot observe 
whether a given individual received a postcard, so we assign treatment based on the mailing zip 
listed in the data. Our estimates thus capture an intent-to-treat effect and provide a lower bound of 
the “true” effect of treatment.  
10 
 
 
Experimental Findings: Overall Patterns of Giving   
Panel B of Table 2 presents summary statistics for our experiment. For example, in 2014 
we observe 169,441 individuals in our control group. Of these 4.4% (or 7,552) elected to donate a 
portion of their Permanent Fund Dividend. The average contribution for individuals in the control 
group is $4.77 which corresponds to $807,548 in aggregate contributions. In total, approximately 
4.9% of all individuals made a donation and Pick.Click.Give. raised more than $3.1 million 
(~$5.79 per person) for eligible nonprofits throughout the state.13 Relative to the 2013 campaign, 
these figures correspond to an approximate 9.3 percent increase in the total number of donors and 
a 23.9% increase in total dollars raised (which partly reflects an increase in PFD registration from 
2013).  For perspective, total charitable contributions by Alaska residents in 2014 was just under 
$260 million dollars. Hence, donations made through Pick.Click.Give. in 2014 accounted for 
approximately 1.2 percent of total giving statewide. 
Disaggregating the data further and exploring outcomes at the charity level, 512 registered 
organizations received at least one donation.14 However, we observe significant heterogeneity 
across organizations in terms of both the number of donations and total dollars received. For 
example, in 2014 organizations received donations, on average, from approximately 88 
individuals. Yet, we observe 48 charities that received donations from 10 or fewer people and 
another 40 that received donations from at least 200 individuals. We observe similar heterogeneity 
across charities in terms of dollars received. The average amount received was approximately 
$6,400, there were 36 organizations that received $500 or less and another 29 organizations that 
received $20,000 or more in total gifts.  
Table A1 in the appendix summarizes the 20 most popular recipients in terms of number 
of donations (upper panel) and dollars received (lower panel) along with information on the cause 
type for each of the charities. As noted in the table, 16 organizations appear amongst the 20 most 
popular in terms of both the number of donations and donation amounts. Moreover, we observe a 
distinct skewness in the distribution of gifts across charitable organizations. Whereas the top 
                                                          
13 The total amount disbursed via the PFD in 2014 was approximately $1.2 billion. Contributions in our experiment 
thus account for approximately 0.3% of this total.  
14 Recall that individuals are allowed to contribute to more than one charitable cause. During the 2014 campaign, we 
observe a total of 44,978 contributions received from 26,610 unique donors.  
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twenty organizations receive nearly 35 percent of donations and 38 percent of overall dollars, the 
five most popular charities account for more than half of these amounts. In fact, the most popular 
recipient in terms of both the number of donations and dollars, Bean’s Café, received more than 
five percent of all total donations and dollars.15   
 
Do Targeted Messages Work? Exploring Treatment Effects   
 There is a growing body of work showing that targeted messages and normative appeals 
can influence an array of pro-social behaviors. Our data are sufficiently rich to explore whether 
framing who benefits from such actions influences the efficacy of such appeals. Evidence for such 
comparison is contained in Table 3. As noted in the table, individuals residing in a zip code that 
received our benefits to self message were approximately 29.5% more likely to give (5.7% versus 
4.4%) than were counterparts in the control group. Moreover, average contributions for those in 
the benefits to self treatment were approximately 54.4% greater ($7.35 versus $4.76) than that 
observed for the control group. Figure 6 complements these data and provides a graphical depiction 
of differences across treatments; the figures highlight that both participation rates and average 
contributions are higher for individuals living in zip codes that received the benefits to self postcard 
than for counterparts living in our control zip codes. These data lead to our first set of results and 
provide evidence that targeted messages, particularly those that emphasize warm-glow 
motivations, do influence charitable contributions: 
 
Result 1: Individuals receiving the benefits to self message (“Warm Your Heart”) were 
more likely to give and provided larger gifts than those in the control group.  
This first result shares similarity with prior work showing the influence of normative appeals on 
behaviors such as environmental conservation (Goldstein et al., 2008; Nolan et al., 2008; Ferraro 
and Price, 2013), honesty in markets (Pruckner and Sausgruber, 2013), or tax compliance 
(Hallsworth et al., 2017). Result 1 also shares similarity with work in marketing showing that self-
benefit appeals increase the frequency with which laboratory subjects express willingness (or 
likelihood) of supporting a charitable cause (White and Peloza, 2009; Fieler et al., 2012; Baek et 
al., 2019). More broadly, our data suggests the importance of self-interests as a driver of donor 
                                                          
15 Bean’s Café is a nonprofit organization located in Anchorage whose mission is to “…feed the hungry and homeless 
without discrimination during the day.” 
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behavior; a finding consonant with prior work showing the importance of motives such as prestige 
and concerns for social image (Harbaugh, 1998; Andreoni and Petrie, 2004; Ariely et al., 2009; 
Lacetera and Macis; 2010; Karlan and McConnell, 2012; Gallus, 2017) or the impact of donor 
gifts or other private benefits linked to the contribution itself (e.g., Morgan and Sefton, 2000; 
Goeree et al., 2005; Landry et al., 2006; Carpenter et al., 2008; Elfenbein and McManus, 2010; 
Landry et al., 2012; Sieg and Zhang, 2012; Eckel et al., 2014; Kessler and Milkman, 2014).  
 To complement these unconditional insights, we estimate a series of linear regression 
models that explicitly control for observable and unobservable differences across potential donors. 
This analysis is important as such factors might systematically differ across treatment groups 
leading to erroneous inference from a simple analysis of the raw data. For our baseline 
specification, we restrict the sample to the years 2013 and 2014, and only include those individuals 
who registered for a PFD in both years. We estimate a linear regression model of the amount 
contributed for each individual that registered for the PFD online (including those who did not 
give) on indicator variables for our experimental treatments and other covariates:16 
𝐷𝑖𝑗𝑡 = (𝛽1𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑗 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑗) ∗ 2014𝑡 + 2014𝑡 + 𝑍𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 
where, Dijt is the contribution level of the j
th individual in the ith zip code in year t, 𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑗 is an 
indicator for receiving the benefits to others message, 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑗 is an indicator for receiving the 
benefits to self message, 2014𝑡 is an indicator for the year 2014, and 𝑍𝑖 are zip code fixed effects. 
Note that non-interacted indicators for treatment are captured by zip code fixed effects. As such, 
the estimated effect of receiving the benefits to others message is given by 𝛽1 and the effect of 
receiving the benefits to self message is given by 𝛽2. To account for unobservable heterogeneities 
at the zip code level, we cluster standard errors at the zip code level. 
 Empirical estimates presented in Model (1) of Table 4 provide additional support for the 
unconditional analysis, albeit with smaller magnitudes. Households in the benefits to self treatment 
contributed approximately $0.927 more than did counterparts in the control group, a difference 
that is statistically significant at the p < 0.001 level. For perspective, this effect corresponds to a 
nearly 20% increase in average contributions.17 With 183,215 online filers in the benefits to self 
group, distributing this message raised an estimated $0.926 x 183,215 = $169,657. Had all online 
                                                          
16 A fundamental assumption underlying the validity of our empirical strategy is the assumption that receipt of a given 
message did not impact the likelihood that the individual registers online. Table 3 provides support for this assumption. 
As noted in the table, filing methods were uncorrelated with the treatment assignment. 
17 From Panel B of Table 2, the average donation in 2014 made by individuals in the control group was $4.76.  
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filers in the state received this message, we estimate that Pick.Click.Give. would have raised an 
additional $0.926 x 540,124 = $500,154. 
 To gain insights into the factors that influence the decision of individuals to contribute 
through Pick.Click.Give., we estimate the linear probability of the contribution decision of 
households that registered for the FPD online by replacing donation amount with the binary 
decision of whether or not to give. Specifically, we replace 𝐷𝑖𝑗 in our baseline estimation equation 
with a binary indicator equal to unity for people that made a donation. 
 Empirical estimates are presented in Table 5 and again indicate that messages that make 
salient self-interests influence the decision to donate. For example, we find that individuals 
residing in a zip that received the benefits to self message were roughly 0.2 percentage points (or 
approximately 4.5 percent) more likely to make a donation through Pick.Click.Give. than were 
counterparts in the control group – a difference that is statistically significant at the p < 0.05 level.  
 A key identifying assumption for our baseline identification strategy is that there were no 
significant differences in pre-existing trends in rates of giving across treatment groups. To test 
these assumptions, and to provide a more nuanced and detailed description of the various treatment 
effects, we estimate a variant of our baseline estimation equation that interacts the two treatment 
indicators with year fixed effects: 
𝐷𝑖𝑗𝑡 = ∑ (𝛽1𝑡
2015
𝑡=2009
𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑗 + 𝛽2𝑡𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑗)𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝑍𝑖 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡, 
 where 2013 is the reference year and treatment effects are estimated for all other years 2009-2015. 
Zip code fixed effects are again given by 𝑍𝑖 and year fixed effects by 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡. For this specification, 
the effect of receiving the benefits to others postcard in year t is given by 𝛽1𝑡 and that for the 
benefits to self postcard is given by 𝛽2𝑡. Successful randomization of treatments requires that there 
were no pre-existing trends such that 𝛽1𝑡 =  𝛽2𝑡 = 0 for all years except 2014, the year of 
treatment (and possibly 2015 if treatment effects persisted over time). As with the baseline 
specification, errors are clustered at the zip code level and the panel is balanced. 
 The upper panel of Figure 7 gives the estimated treatment effects for the propensity to 
donate, and the lower panel gives the results for donation size. These results largely complement 
our baseline findings, and suggest that in 2014 subjects in the benefits to self treatment were 
approximately 0.2 percent points more likely to participate in Pick.Click.Give. and give roughly 
$1.00 more than subjects in the control group. While this specification uncovers some pre-existing 
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trend in in both the propensity to give and average donation size for the benefits to self group, for 
the two years immediately preceding treatment, trend is negligible.  
 Turning to the effects of messages highlighting benefits to others (“Make Alaska Better for 
Everyone”), we report a second result: 
 
Result 2: The benefits to others message had the same positive impact on the likelihood of 
giving as the benefits to self message, but there was no effect on average donations relative 
to the control. 
Heterogeneity in the response to our benefits to self and benefits to others treatments provides 
evidence that donors are responding to the content of our messages and not only the receipt of a 
message highlighting Pick.Click.Give. Importantly, this allows us to rule out models such as 
bounded rationality (Gabaix et al., 2006; Gabaix, 2014) or observation (“Hawthorne”) effects 
(Levitt and List, 2007) as under any such model, the act of receiving a targeted message advertising 
Pick.Click.Give. should lead to increased donations. Hence, we would expect to observe treatment 
effects in both treatment groups.  
Summary statistics in Table 2 suggest that both average contributions ($5.21 versus $4.72) 
and participation rates (4.5% versus 4.4%) for individuals in our benefits to others treatment are 
statistically indistinguishable from those observed amongst counterparts in the control group (see 
also Figure 6). But comparing unconditional means can obscure important pre-existing differences 
in giving across treatments. 
 To complement these raw statistics, we return to the empirical estimates outlined in Tables 
4 and 5 which present linear regression models exploring the impact of treatment on average 
contributions and underlying rates of giving, respectively. Model 1 of Table 4 shows that the 
average donation made in the benefits to others treatment was approximately $0.37 more than that 
observed amongst counterparts in the control – a difference that is not statistically significant at 
any meaningful level. However, the approximate $0.56 difference in average contributions relative 
to that observed in the benefits to self treatment is significant at the p < 0.10 level.18 
                                                          
18 Because differences in treatment effects are  linear combinations of multiple parameter estimates from the baseline 
estimation equation, the delta method was used to construct confidence intervals (Stata post-estimation command 
lincom). 
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 Considering average participation rates, we find similar treatment effects across the two 
groups. As noted in Model 1 of Table 5, there is no discernable difference in the likelihood of 
giving across those in the benefits to self and benefits to others treatments, and people in both 
groups are more likely to contribute than those in the control. 
These two findings are jointly explained by larger average donations being given by 
individuals in the benefits to self treatment. Model 1 of Table 6 shows that, conditional on 
participation in the charitable program, individuals in the benefits to self group gave $10.07 more 
than subjects in the control group (significant at the p < .05 level) and individuals in the benefits 
to others group behaved statistically no differently than those in the control group. Figure 8 was 
constructed similar to Figure 7, and reinforces these findings. Conditional on giving, subjects in 
the benefits to self group made larger donations and that this effect was only significant in the year 
of treatment, 2014. 
 Taken together, our first two results provide evidence that targeted messages and normative 
appeals can influence donor behavior. However, the efficacy of such appeals depends upon the 
way in which the benefits of giving are framed; donors are more motivated by appeals that 
highlight self-benefits than those that highlight how giving benefits others. Such differences are 
consistent with findings from the marketing literature showing the superiority of self-benefit 
appeals to give when the choice is made in private or in environments with low observability 
(White and Peloza, 2009). Moreover, our findings share similarity with prior work using tests of 
crowd-out to identify the relative importance of impure altruism or warm-glow versus altruism 
and concerns for the well-being of others (e.g,. Kingma, 1989; Andreoni, 1993; Payne, 1998; 
Andreoni and Payne, 2003, 2011; Eckel et al., 2005; Crumpler and Grossman, 2008; Andreoni et 
al., 2014; Ottoni-Wilhelm et al., 2017). As in this prior work, donors in our experiment appear to 
be motivated more by self-benefit concerns than the well-being of others.  
 
Exploring Heterogeneity across Donor Types 
 Our analysis thus far has examined behavior pooled across all donor types. However, as 
noted in Landry et al. (2010) there are important differences in behavior across warm- and cold-
list households – prior donors are more likely to give and are less responsive to both conditional 
and unconditional gifts. As we observe donations made through Pick.Click.Give. in 2013, our data 
are sufficiently rich to allow us to explore heterogeneity across different donor types. To do so, we 
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augment our baseline regression models in Tables 4 and 5 to include an indicator variable for any 
individual who made a contribution in 2013. Rather than interacting this variable with the 
treatment and year indicators (which would require a triple interaction term), we re-estimate our 
baseline equations restricting the data set to cold-list (Model 5) and then warm-list (Model 6) 
donors. Results for these models suggest a third set of results: 
Result 3a: Prior donors are more likely to give and provide larger average gifts than 
prospective donors. 
Result 3b: Prospective donors in the benefits to self (“Warm Your Heart”) treatment are 
more likely to give and provide larger gifts than counterparts in the control and benefits to 
others (“Make Alaska Better”) group. 
Support for Result 3a is provided in Model 2 of Tables 4 and 5. As noted in Table 4, average 
donations for warm-list individuals are approximately $93.75 greater than that for a prospective 
donor. As noted in Table 5, much of this difference is explained by dramatic differences in 
participation rates. Whereas less than 2% of prospective donors give through Pick.Click.Give. (see 
Panel B of Table 2), two-thirds of all warm-list individuals elect to give.  
Support for Result 3b is also provided in Tables 4 and 5. For example, as noted in Model 
5 of Table 4, prospective (“Cold”) donors in the benefits to self treatment provide average gifts 
that are approximately $0.646 (44.5%) greater than those prospective donors observed in the 
control group. For prior donors, the relative effect of the benefits to self message is less pronounced 
– such types provide average gifts that are approximately 9.8% greater than a warm-list counterpart 
in the control group.19 Importantly, both of these differences are statistically significant at 
conventional levels. 
 We observe similar data patterns when exploring participation rates. As noted in Model 5 
of Table 5, prospective donors in the benefits to self treatment are 0.43 percentage points (roughly 
25%) more likely to give than a prospective donor in the control group – a difference that is 
statistically significant at the p < 0.01 level. For prior donors (Model 6), the relative impact is again 
less pronounced. There is an approximate 5.4% increase in the likelihood of giving for a warm-list 
individual in the benefits to self treatment.  
                                                          
19 From Table 4 Model 3 note that warm-list individuals that received the benefits to self postcard on average give 
$7.93 more than warm-list individuals in control zip codes. This amounts to a 7.93/80.55 = 9.8% increase in the 
average donation size. 
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 Figure 9 presents the estimated treatment effects by year (the second estimation equation) 
for subjects that did and did not participate in Pick.Click.Give. at any point between 2009 and 
2013. The upper panel shows that, for warm-list donors that gave at least once between 2009 and 
2013, both treatments similarly increased the probability of donating. However, for subjects that 
had never before participated in Pick.Click.Give., we see that only the benefits to self postcard 
increased the probability of participating. These results are complemented by those reported for 
donation size in Figure 10. For previous donors, we see that both treatment groups gave larger 
average donations than the control, but this result is only significant for the benefits to self group. 
We again see that, for individuals that had not previously participated in the program, receiving 
the benefits to self message increased the average donation size and that receiving the benefits to 
others message had no effect.  
Taken jointly, these differences suggest an interesting asymmetry. Whereas the benefits to 
self message impacted both prospective and prior donors, the effects – on both the propensity to 
donate and average donation size – were largest for people that did not previously participate in 
Pick.Click.Give. 
 A final result of interest concerns the impact of age and gender on donor behavior. As noted 
in List (2004), there are marked differences in generosity across men and women – particularly 
when exploring the behavior of young men. As we observe data on the age and gender of every 
individual in our data, we can explore similar patterns. To do so, we augment our baseline 
specifications to include indicators for women, those 50 and older, and those under the age of 18.  
As noted in Model 3 of Table 4, women and those age 50 or older provided larger average gifts 
than do other donor types. Moreover, average contributions for those under the age of 18 are 
significantly lower than those 50 and over. We observe similar differences along the extensive 
margin. As noted in Model 3 of Table 5, women and those age 50 or older were more likely to 
give than were other donor types, while those under the age of 18 were less likely to give. 
 Given that prior donors were more likely to give and provided larger average gifts than 
others, one may be concerned that these demographic effects are capturing differences in the 
likelihood an individual had given in the past. To rule out such possibility, we augment our 
regression to include controls for past donors along with our indicators for age and gender. Results 
from such specifications are included in column 4 of Tables 4 and 5. Conditional on past donations, 
women and those aged 50 or older were more likely to give than other types, while those under 
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the age of 18 were less likely to give. However, whereas before women were more likely to give 
larger gifts, conditional on past donations, we see that they give smaller average gifts.  
 Interestingly, the observed gender differences are consistent with findings in Della Vigna 
et al. (2013) who find differences in the distribution for altruism across men and women. In our 
setting, women were more likely to give and provided larger average gifts. However, conditioned 
on giving, it was men who provided more generous gifts. Taken jointly, this suggests that the 
distribution of altruism for women was less disperse than the distribution for men; the precise 
pattern identified by the structural estimates in Della Vigna et al. (2013).  
 
Robustness Checks   
Recall that our randomization occurred at the zip code level. While we balanced on 
observables, there may be unobserved differences across zip codes that could impact rates of 
giving independent of treatment. For example, during the 2014 campaign, Pick.Click.Give. 
sponsored a media campaign, particularly in the three largest markets in the state – Anchorage, 
Juneau and Fairbanks, that used television and radio ads encouraging individuals to donate through 
Pick.Click.Give. Unfortunately, we do not observe the timing or content of such advertisements 
and thus are unable to directly control for any such efforts. Similarly, larger charities such as 
Bean’s Café and United Way of Anchorage conducted their own marketing campaigns targeting 
potential donors.  
As a first set of robustness checks, we augment our baseline specifications by restricting 
our sample to zip codes in Anchorage, Fairbanks, and Juneau and re-estimate our baseline set of 
equations. Given the previous advertising campaigns delivered to these markets, this sub-sample 
of individuals is more likely to be aware of the Pick.Click.Give. program. If treatment effects 
simply reflect learning about the existence of Pick.Click.Give., then we may expect to find 
negligent treatment effects for this specification. Table A2 shows that the effect of receiving either 
message was smaller than before, but remains statistically significant for the benefits to self 
message. Table A3 reinforces the idea that, within the three major Alaskan markets, only the 
benefits to self message effectively increased the propensity to give. 
Our data includes both the home and mailing zips for every individual in our sample. For 
most individuals, the home and mailing zips matched. However, for approximately 172,614 (18%) 
of our 2013-2014 sample, the home and mailing zip codes do not match. For such individuals, it 
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is uncertain whether they would have received our treatment postcards and if they did receive a 
postcard which postcard they would observe. As a third robustness check on our results, we thus 
restrict the sample to the subset of individuals for whom the home and mailing zips matched and 
re-estimate our models of interest.  
 Results for this robustness check are contained in Tables A4 and A5 of the appendix. 
Importantly, all three of our main results are unaffected if we restrict the sample to those with 
matching home and mailing zips. Those receiving the benefits to self message are more likely to 
provide larger average gifts than do counterparts in the control and benefits to others treatment. In 
contrast, the average donation of those receiving the benefits to others postcard is no different from 
that observed amongst counterparts in the control group. Though we again see that individuals in 
both treatment groups were equally as likely to make a donation, and more likely to give a donation 
than those individuals in the control group. 
 A number of individuals also receive mail to a P.O. Box and so may have received a post 
card with a lag, or may not have received it at all. Thus, we also exclude from the analysis 
individuals whose mailing address is a P.O. Box and run our empirical models on the resulting 
subsample of 389,501 individuals. Results for this robustness check are contained in Tables A6 
and A7 of the appendix and are consonant with results from our main specifications. Those 
receiving the benefits to self message were approximately 0.25 percentage points (about 5.3%) 
more likely to make a donation and provided average donations that were about $1.07 
(approximately 22%) greater than counterparts in the control. We again find that, while the 
propensity to give was similarly affected by the two treatments, the benefits to self message was 
more effective at increasing the average donation. 
 As a final robustness check and plausible placebo test, we restrict our sample to those 
individuals whose physical zip codes did not match their mailing zip codes in the year of the 
treatment, 2014. Because some people with mis-matching zip codes may have still received a 
mailer, we anticipate that this restriction in the data will not significantly affect estimated treatment 
effects but may inflate the associated standard errors. These results are given in Tables A8 and A9 
in the appendix and show that, while the point estimates are similar to before, treatment effects 
mostly are not significant, as expected.  
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Taken jointly, these robustness checks give us confidence that we are capturing a response 
to our targeted messages rather than some unobserved heterogeneity across zips or rural areas that 
may not have been familiar with Pick.Click.Give. prior to postcards being sent out.  
 
Do Treatment Effects Persist?  
 There is a growing body of work showing that behavioral interventions tend to wane over 
time (e.g., Gneezy and List, 2006; Landry et al., 2010; Ferraro and Price, 2013; Allcott and Rogers, 
2014). Given this body of work, it is important to explore whether the effects of our targeted 
messages are sustained across campaigns and impact long-run patterns of giving. To better 
ascertain the long-run impacts of our different messages, we use data on treatment assignment in 
2014 and examine whether this impacts contributions through Pick.Click.Give. during the 2015 
campaign. As with the original experiment, we restrict the sample to those individuals who 
registered for the Permanent Fund Dividend online and were thus provided the opportunity to 
given through Pick.Click.Give.  
Exploring differences across those who received the benefits to self message in 2014 and 
those in our control group, we see the first evidence that treatment effects may persist. Figure 7 
shows that, relative to counterparts that did not receive a message in 2014, those that received the 
benefits to self message were approximately 0.28 percentage points (4.2%) more likely to donate 
in 2015 than individuals that did not receive a message. Similarly, average donations in 2015 for 
those in our benefits to self group were about $1.05 (14.7%) greater than those who did not receive 
a message during the 2014 campaign. We observe similar differences if we compare the 
contribution decisions of those originally assigned to our benefits to self treatment with 
counterparts originally assigned to the benefits to others treatment. 
Separating the data according to previous participation in Pick.Click.Give., the effect of 
the benefits to self message shows signs of persistence for both previous donors (people who gave 
at least once between 2009 and 2013), and especially for those who had never participated in 
Pick.Click.Give. before. For the latter group, subjects that received the benefits to self message 
were 0.5 percentage points (18.5%) more likely to give in 2015. Similarly, from the lower panel 
of Figure 4 we see that in 2015, subjects that received the benefits to self message gave $0.67 
(35.7%) more on average than subjects in the control. Taken together, these results suggest the 
effect of the benefits to self message is persistent, especially for first time givers. Yet, as in past 
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work (e.g., Ferraro and Price, 2013; Allcott and Rogers, 2014; Bernedo et al., 2014) the 
effectiveness of the benefits to others “nudge” waned over time; subjects in this treatment group 
behaved no differently than those in the control group in 2015. 
 
IV. Conclusions 
A growing body of literature sets forth to explore the economics of charity and the 
relationship between fundraisers and potential donors. Much of this work has focused on 
measuring the effectiveness of different fundraising techniques such as charitable lotteries or 
matching gifts that change the relative costs of benefits of giving. Our study extends this literature 
by exploring the effect of targeted messages and normative appeals on donor behavior.  
To do so, we designed a natural field experiment in conjunction with the state of Alaska’s 
Pick.Click.Give. program. As part of the 2014 marketing campaign, we randomly allocated the 
approximate 290,000 households in the state into either a control group or one of two treatment 
groups that received a postcard that included a slogan to highlight either benefits to self (“Warm 
your heart”) or benefits to others (“Make Alaska better for everyone”). The slogans were designed 
to reflect the two main motives for charitable giving – concerns for the benefits to self (impure 
altruism or “warm-glow”) or concerns for the well-being of others (pure altruism) – and provide a 
way to disentangle the relative importance of each. 
Results from our experiment highlight the relative importance of benefits to self as a driver 
of giving. Individuals who received the benefits to self message were approximately 4.5 percent 
more likely to give than counterparts in the control group and tend to support more charitable 
organizations. Moreover, average contributions in the benefits to self treatment were 
approximately 20 percent greater than those in our baseline. Messages that highlight the benefits 
to others, in contrast, had a similar impact on the likelihood of giving but had no impact on average 
donations. Interestingly, these same data patterns are observed for both warm-list households who 
gave through Pick.Click.Give. in 2013 and cold-list counterparts who did give in the prior year’s 
campaign – although the effects are more pronounced amongst cold-list households.  
 For academics, our results are noteworthy in that they provide a deeper understanding of 
individual behavior and what drives the private provision of public goods. Importantly, our 
findings suggest that giving is motivated by self-interests rather than concerns for charitable output 
per se. That said, we cannot rule out alternative explanations such as the identifiable victim effect 
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and motivational crowding that arises when one perceives the efficacy of their donation to be low 
for the relative inefficacy of the “Make Alaska Better” message. Future work should explore this 
possibility and identify why the benefits to others message had smaller effects on overall patterns 
of giving.  
 Our results are also noteworthy in that the distribution of gifts across cause types is 
fundamentally different than the distribution of gifts across cause types nationwide. While 
religious and education based causes receive the largest fraction of donations nationwide, the most 
popular cause types in our data are human services and animals and the environment – each of 
which receive more than 20 percent of all dollars. In part this can be explained by differences in 
the composition of charities included in Pick.Click.Give. and the composition of charities 
nationwide. Yet, the differences could also reflect the absence of fund-raising efforts and direct 
asks in our experiment. Given past work highlighting the importance of social pressures and the 
ask on donor behavior, future work should explore whether active solicitations influence the types 
of causes donors select and the allocation of funds across organizations.  
For practitioners, our results are noteworthy in that they suggest ways to increase giving 
using simple messages that appeal to the donor’s self-interests and the good feelings triggered by 
the act of giving. These findings are of particular interest to nonprofits in the state of Alaska and 
the design of the Pick.Click.Give. program which was established to increase overall giving 
statewide. If we had sent the benefits to self message to all households in the state, aggregate 
contributions would have increased by more than $500,000.  
Yet, the charitable marketplace is comprised of numerous nonprofits that compete for 
donations from a finite number of budget constrained agents. In such an environment, changes in 
giving through Pick.Click.Give. could impact aggregate patterns of giving. Future work should 
explore whether the dollars attracted via our appeal represent an increase in aggregate giving or 
simply a substitution of funds across charities and/or time. 
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Figure 1: Permanent Fund Dividend Amounts (1982-2015)
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Note: Panel (a) gives information on total annual disbursements and panel (b) gives the
per person dividend amount. Data provided by the Permanent Fund Division of the Alaska
Department of Revenue.
Table 1: Historic Patterns of Giving to Pick.Click.Give
# of Donors Total Dollars Contributed
2009 4,005 $400,385
2010 7,657 $697,099
2011 15,863 $1,317,431
2012 20,436 $1,991,565
2013 24,336 $2,381,650
2014 26,610 $3,132,583
2015 31,587 $3,490,455
Note: Cell entries provide data on historic patterns of giving
through the Pick.Click.Give program. Cell entries can be read
as follows: in 2009 there were 4,005 donors who gave a combined
$400,385 to eligible nonprots in the state.
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Figure 2: Treatment Postcard Benets to Others
 
 
Note: The upper frame shows the front page and the lower frame the back page of the Benets
to Others postcard. Treatment letters were delivered as standard-sized postcards. Variation
in framing is presented graphically on the front page and verbally on the back page.
2
Figure 3: Treatment Postcard Benets to Self
 
 
Note: The upper frame shows the front page and the lower frame the back page of the Benets
to Self postcard. Treatment letters were delivered as standard-sized postcards. Variation in
framing is presented graphically on the front page and verbally on the back page.
3
Figure 4: Geographic Overview of Experimental Population and Treatment Assignment
 
Note: Alaskan ZIP codes are shaded according to their random treatment assignment. Light
gray represents control (C) ZIP codes, medium gray Make Alaska Better (Others) ZIP codes,
and dark gray Warm Your Heart (Self) ZIP codes. White spaces are due to national parks or
areas with very low population density, which were excluded from the randomization. Circles
represent all PO boxes and their respective treatment assignment.
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Figure 5: Geographic Overview of Experimental Population and Treatment Assignment
                              
(a) Anchorage
                              
(b) Fairbanks
 
(c) Juneau
                              
(d) Kokiak
Note: Alaska's main metropolitan area ZIP codes are shaded according to their random treat-
ment assign- ment. Light gray represents control (C) ZIP codes, medium gray Make Alaska
Better (MAB) ZIP codes, and dark gray Warm Your Heart (WYH) ZIP codes. White spaces
are due to national parks or areas with very low population density, which were excluded from
the randomization. Circles represent PO boxes and their respective treatment assignment.
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Table 2: Summary Statistics for 2014 Treatment Assignment
Control Others Self
Panel A: 2013
Individuals 152,916 165,377 164,871
Donors 7,103 7,589 9,644
Donation Rate 0.046 0.045 0.058
Total Donations 648,475 733,300 999,875
Average Donation 4.240 4.434 6.064
Panel B: 2014 [Year of Treatment]
Individuals 169,441 187,468 183,215
Donors 7,552 8,498 10,560
Donation Rate 0.044 0.045 0.057
Donation Rate (Warm-list) 0.668 0.685 .704
Donation Rate (Cold List) 0.017 0.018 0.021
Total Donations 807,548 976,725 1,348,310
Average Donation 4.766 5.210 7.359
Average Donation (Warm-list) 80.555 91.429 100.871
Average Donation (Cold-list) 1.449 1.572 2.163
Zip Codes 89 90 89
Panel C: 2015
Individuals 154,169 167,359 166,441
Donors 9,304 9,985 12,298
Donation Rate 0.060 .059 0.073
Total Donations 941,137 1,084,536 1,464,782
Average Donation 6.104 6.480 8.800
Note: Summary statistics are presented for campaign years 2013 (Panel A), 2014 (Panel
B), and 2015 (Panel C). All cell entries are based on the random assignment of the 2014
campaign. Treatment postcards were only delivered in 2014. Statistics are for online lers
only.
Table 3: Means Tests
(1) (2) (3) p-value
Control Others Self (1):(2) (1):(3) (2):(3)
Propensity to Donate 0.044 0.045 0.057 0.871 0.002 0.008
(.003) (.004) (.004)
Average Donation 4.765 5.209 7.358 0.612 0.001 0.028
(.461) (.874) (.780)
Registered Online 0.823 0.815 0.843 0 .767 0.487 0.241
(.022) (.026) (.029)
Note: Cell entries in columns 1-3 provide variable means in 2014. Registered Online is the share of
people ling for their PFD online, which is necessary to participate in the PCG program. We present
p-values of two-sample t-tests comparing dierent treatment groups in the last three columns. Standard
errors are clustered at the zip code level.
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Table 4: Donation: 2013-2014
Full Data Cold List Warm List
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2014 .7795 .7795 .7066 .7436 1.340 -10.740
(.1844) (.1844) (.1836) (.1838) (.1181) (2.593)
Others×2014 .3684 .3684 .3737 .3710 .1124 5.542
(.2910) (.2910) (.2911) (.2911) (.1973) (3.543)
Self×2014 .9267 .9267 .9221 .9244 .6459 7.933
(.2769) (.2769) (.2762) (.2765) (.1989) (3.096)
Donor 2013 93.749 93.219
(3.147) (3.132)
Female 2.131 -.2404
(.1230) (.1010)
Under 18 -3.612 -1.211
(.3074) (.1360)
Over 49 4.942 2.436
(.3447) (.2586)
(Self-Others)×2014 .5583 .5583 .5483 .5534 .5335 2.390
(.3056) (.3056) (.3050) (.3053) (.2249) (2.949)
R2 .004 .189 .009 .190 .003 .018
N 966,328 966,328 966,328 966,328 917,656 48,672
Note: Columns 1-6 include zip code xed eects. Panels are balanced and standard errors clustered at
the zip code level. Individuals younger than 18 (older than 49) are dened as Under 18 (Over 49).
Columns 5 and 6 give the results after restricting the data to cold-list and warm-list donors, respectively.
Figure 6: Average Donation and & Propensity to Donate
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Table 5: Propensity to Donate: 2013-2014
Full Data Cold List Warm List
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2014 .0003 .0003 -.0000 .0003 .0165 -.3319
(.0005) (.0005) (.0005) (.0005) (.0010) (.0078)
Others×2014 .0021 .0021 .0021 .0021 .0012 .0174
(.0007) (.0007) (.0007) (.0007) (.0015) (.0110)
Self×2014 0.0020 .0020 .0020 .0020 .0043 .0365
(.0009) (.0009) (.0009) (.0009) (.0014) (.0107)
Donor 2013 .8337 .832
(.0025) (.0025)
Female .0246 .0034
(.0009) (.0002)
Under 18 -.0251 -.0036
(.0014) (.0003)
Over 49 .0248 .0025
(.0013) (.0003)
(Self-Others)×2014 -.00009 -.00009 -.0001 -.0001 .0031 .0191
(.0009) (.0009) (.0009) (.0009) (.0014) (.0106)
R2 .006 .685 .017 .685 .010 .193
N 966,328 966,328 966,328 966,328 917,656 48,672
Note: Columns 1-6 include zip code xed eects. Panels are balanced and standard errors clustered at
the zip code level. Individuals younger than 18 (older than 49) are dened as Under 18 (Over 49).
Columns 5 and 6 give the results after restricting the data to cold-list and warm-list donors, respectively.
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Table 6: Donation Conditional on Giving: 2013-2014
Full Data Cold List Warm List
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2014 42.007 42.007 41.408 41.518 81.084 22.151
(3.259) (3.259) (3.220) (3.227) (5.321) (3.380)
Others×2014 5.286 5.286 5.319 5.313 .8357 6.511
(5.127) (5.127) (5.106) (5.109) (7.208) (5.321)
Self×2014 10.076 10.076 10.010 10.022 13.979 9.412
(4.287) (4.287) (4.241) (4.249) (6.875) (4.288)
Donor 2013 75.404 69.964
(2.882) (2.912)
Female -9.758 -13.008
(1.888) (1.896)
Under 18 -47.347 -41.391
(3.302) (2.976)
Over 49 35.119 28.698
(3.604) (3.574)
(Self-Others)×2014 4.789 4.789 4.691 4.7090 13.143 2.901
(4.839) (4.839) (4.819) (4.8231) (6.525) (4.884)
R2 .036 .075 .058 .091 .126 .027
N 50,392 50,392 50,392 50,392 16,908 33,484
Note: Columns 1-6 include zip code xed eects. Panels are balanced and standard errors clustered at
the zip code level. Individuals younger than 18 (older than 49) are dened as Under 18 (Over 49).
Columns 5 and 6 give the results after restricting the data to cold-list and warm-list donors, respectively.
9
Figure 7: Treatment Eects by Year
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Note: The reference year is 2013. Standard errors are clustered at the zip code level. For
both average donation size and the propensity to give, treatment eects are estimated using
a balanced panel and N = 2, 120, 251. For the upper panel R2 = .556 and for the lower panel
R2 = .524.
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Figure 8: Donation, Conditional on Giving by Year
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Note: The reference year is 2013. Standard errors are clustered at the zip code level. Data is
restricted to those individuals that gave in 2014. N = 128, 261 and R2 = .552.
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Figure 9: Propensity to Donate by Year: Conditional on Previous Participation
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Note: The reference year is 2013. Standard errors are clustered at the zip code level. Previ-
ously Gave indicates that a subject gave at least once from 2009 to 2013. Treatment eects
are estimated using a balanced panel. For the upper panel N = 175, 007 and R2 = .411. For
the lower panel N = 1, 945, 244 and R2 = .208.
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Figure 10: Donation by Year: Conditional on Previous Participation
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Note: The reference year is 2013. Standard errors are clustered at the zip code level. Previ-
ously Gave indicates that a subject gave at least once from 2009 to 2013. Treatment eects
are estimated using a balanced panel. For the upper panel N = 175, 007 and R2 = .526. For
the lower panel N = 1, 945, 244 and R2=.198.
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1 Appendix
Table A.1: The 20 Most Popular Recipients
# of Donations Cause Type
Beans Café: The Children's Lunchbox 2253 Human Services
KSKA Alaska Public Media 1554 Arts, Culture, and Humanities
Abused Women's Aid in Crisis Inc. 1380 Human Services
Food Bank of Alaska 1248 Human Services
Alaska Dog and Puppy Rescue 1208 Animals
Brother Francis Shelter Clare House 916 Human Services
Friends of Pets 900 Animals
Planned Parenthood of the Great Northwest 826 Health
Alaska SPCA 635 Animals
American Red Cross 559 Human Services
Fairbanks Animal Shelter Fund 507 Animals
The Salvation Army 476 Human Services
Alaska Zoo 469 Animals
Adopt a Cat 442 Animals
Fairbanks Community Food Bank 440 Human Services
Make a Wish Foundation 425 Health
Aiding Women in Abuse and Rape Emergencies 412 Human Services
Hospice of Anchorage 360 Health
Alaska Special Olympics 348 Human Services
Standing Together Against Rape 339 Public Benet
Total Dollars Cause Type
Beans Café: The Chilren's Lunchbox $161,025 Human Services
KSKA Alaska Public Media $147,500 Arts, Culture, and Humanities
Food Bank of Alaska $117,800 Human Services
Brother Francis Shelter Clare House $90,225 Human Services
Abused Women's Aid in Crisis $85,925 Human Services
Planed Parenthood of Great Northwest $70,275 Health
Alaska Dog and Puppy Rescue $63,000 Animals
Friends of Pets $55,800 Animals
Alaska SPCA $41,875 Animals
American Red Cross $39,725 Human Services
The Salvation Army $38,725 Human Services
University of Alaska, Fairbanks $35,250 Education
Fairbanks Animal Shelter Fund $31,500 Animals
Fairbanks Community Food Bank Service $29,525 Human Services
Adopt a Cat $28,775 Animals
Hospice of Anchorage $28,400 Health
Kenai Peninsula Food Bank $25,950 Human Services
Aiding Women in abuse and Rape Emergencies $25,650 Human Services
University of Alaska, Anchorage $24,600 Education
Big Brothers Big Sisters of Alaska $23,950 Human Services
Note: All outcomes measured in 2014.
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Table A.2: Donation: 2013-2014 (Cities)
Full Data Cold List Warm List
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2014 1.412 1.412 1.325 1.366 1.833 -5.313
(.1859) (.1859) (.1847) (.1851) (.1382) (1.725)
Others×2014 .0757 .0757 .0749 .0753 -.0363 1.529
(.4360) (.4360) (.4354) (.4356) (.2777) (4.031)
Self×2014 .6334 .6334 .6346 .6288 .4461 3.883
(.347) (.3478) (.3457) (.3466) (.2650) (2.739)
Donor 2013 103.02 102.392
(3.914) (3.905)
Female 2.476 -.5330
(.2009) (.1545)
Under 18 -5.122 -1.775
(.4368) (.2224)
Over 49 5.913 3.119
(.4898) (.4262)
(Self-Others)×2014 .5577 .5577 .5497 .5535 .4824 2.353
(.4918) (.4918) (.4908) (.4913) (.3304) (4.220)
R2 .0026 .189 .008 .190 .002 .009
N 474,682 474,682 474,682 474,682 446,302 28,380
Note: Columns 1-6 include zip code xed eects. Panels are balanced and standard errors clustered
at the zip code level. Only zip codes in Anchorage, Fairbanks, and Juneau are included. Individuals
younger than 18 (older than 49) are dened as Under 18 (Over 49). Columns 5 and 6 give the results
after restricting the data to cold-list and warm-list donors, respectively.
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Table A.3: Propensity to Donate: 2013-2014 (Cities)
Full Data Cold List Warm List
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2014 .0009 .0009 .0005 .0008 .0210 -.3202
(.0005) (.0005) (.0005) (.0005) (.0003 (.0084)
Others×2014 .0011 .0011 .0011 .0011 -.0007 .0118
(.0007) (.0007) (.0007) (.0007) (.0016) (.0134)
Self×2014 .0021 .0021 .0021 .0021 .0017 .0305
(.0010) (.0010) (.0010) (.0010) (.0011) (.0112)
Donor 2013 .8380 .8366
(.0026) (.0026)
Female .0283 .0037
(.0012) (.0004)
Under 18 -.0320 -.0047
(.0014) (.0005)
Over 49 .0246 .0017
(.0017) (.0005)
(Self-Others)×2014 .0009 .0009 .0009 .0009 .0024 .0186
(.0010) (.0010) (.0010) (.0010) (.0019) (.0128)
R2 .0032 .690 .014 .690 .011 .179
N 474,682 474,682 474,682 474,682 446,302 28,380
Note: Columns 1-6 include zip code xed eects. Panels are balanced and standard errors clustered
at the zip code level. Only zip codes in Anchorage, Fairbanks, and Juneau are included. Individuals
younger than 18 (older than 49) are dened as Under 18 (Over 49). Columns 5 and 6 give the results
after restricting the data to cold-list and warm-list donors, respectively.
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Table A.4: Donation: 2013-2014 (Matching on Physical and Mailing Zip Code)
Full Data Cold List Warm List
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2014 .7357 .7357 .6591 .6983 1.277 -10.470
(.1951) (.1951) (.1948) (.1950) (.1154) (3.018)
Others×2014 .4311 .4311 .4352 .4331 .1646 5.992
(.3141) (.3141) (.3144) (.3143) (.1953) (4.146)
Self×2014 .9717 .9717 .9651 .9685 .7135 7.703
(.2919) (.2919) (.2913) (.2916) (.2204) (3.401)
Donor 2013 94.286 93.709
(3.432) (3.410)
Female 2.119 -.2209
(.1253) (.1106)
Under 18 -3.649 -1.244
(.3346) (.1478)
Over 49 5.183 2.529
(.4036) (.2925)
(Self-Others)×2014 .5406 .5406 .5298 .5353 .5489 1.710
(.3282) (.3282) (.3279) (.3280) (.2451) (3.247)
R2 .004 .192 .010 .192 .003 .018
N 793,714 793,714 793,714 793,714 753,280 40,434
Note: Columns 1-6 include zip code xed eects. Panels are balanced and standard errors clustered at
the zip code level. Only those individuals with matching mailing and physical zip codes are included in
the sample. Individuals younger than 18 (older than 49) are dened as Under 18 (Over 49). Columns
5 and 6 give the results after restricting the data to cold-list and warm-list donors, respectively.
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Table A.5: Propensity to Donate: 2013-2014 (Matching on Physical and Mailing Zip Code)
Full Data Cold List Warm List
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2014 .0004 .0004 .0000 .0003 .0160 -.3238
(.0006) (.0006) (.0006) (.0006) (.0012) (.0080)
Others×2014 .0020 .0020 .0020 .0020 .0015 .0149
(.0009) (.0009) (.0009) (.0009) (.0017) (.0118)
Self×2014 .0023 .0023 .0023 .0023 .0051 .0352
(.0010) (.0010) (.0010) (.0010) (.0016) (.0110)
Donor 2013 .8371 .8357
(.0026) (.0026)
Female .0242 .0033
(.0010) (.0003)
Under 18 -.0250 -.0036
(.0015) (.0003)
Over 49 .0261 .0025
(.0014) (.0004)
(Self-Others)×2014 .0003 .0003 .0003 .0003 .0036 .0203
(.0010) (.0010) (.0010) (.0010) (.0015) (.0116)
R2 .007 .690 .018 .690 .010 .189
N 793,714 793,714 793,714 793,714 753,280 40,434
Note: Columns 1-6 include zip code xed eects. Panels are balanced and standard errors clustered at
the zip code level. Only those individuals with matching mailing and physical zip codes are included in
the sample. Individuals younger than 18 (older than 49) are dened as Under 18 (Over 49). Columns
5 and 6 give the results after restricting the data to cold-list and warm-list donors, respectively.
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Table A.6: Donation: 2013-2014 (No P.O. Boxes)
Full Data Cold List Warm List
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2014 .7651 .7651 .6882 .7269 1.367 -11.102
(.2208) (.2208) (.2199) (.2202) (.1357) (2.980)
Others×2014 .4290 .4290 .4336 .4312 .1281 6.256
(.3479) (.3479) (.3482) (.3481) (.2236) (4.139)
Self×2014 1.073 1.073 1.067 1.070 .7280 8.978
(.3190) (.3190) (.3183) (.3186) (.2299) (3.400)
Donor 2013 94.614 94.046
(3.624) (3.605)
Female 2.128 -.2949
(.1307) (.1136)
Under 18 -3.795 -1.263
(.3664) (.1568)
Over 49 5.282 2.621
(.4049) (.3057)
(Self-Others)×2014 .6647 .6447 .6336 .6392 .5998 2.721
(.3540) (.3540) (.3537) (.3538) (.2569) (3.307)
R2 .003 .191 .009 .192 .002 .015
N 779,002 779,002 779,002 779,002 738,182 40,820
Note: Columns 1-6 include zip code xed eects. Panels are balanced and standard errors clustered at
the zip code level. All zip codes corresponding to a P.O. Box are dropped. Individuals younger than 18
(older than 49) are dened as Under 18 (Over 49). Columns 5 and 6 give the results after restricting
the data to cold-list and warm-list donors, respectively.
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Table A.7: Propensity to Donate: 2013-2014 (No P.O. Boxes)
Full Data Cold List Warm List
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2014 .0005 .0005 .0001 .0004 .0171 -.3275
(.0005) (.0005) (.0005) (.0005) (.0012) (.0088)
Others×2014 .0028 .0028 .0028 .0028 .0016 .0211
(.0009) (.0009) (.0009) (.0009) (.0017) (.0120)
Self×2014 .0025 .0025 .0025 .0025 .0047 .0399
(.0010) (.0009) (.0009) (.0009) (.0015) (.0113)
Donor 2013 .8369 .8355
(.0027) (.0027)
Female .0251 .0035
(.0010) (.0002)
Under 18 -.0262 -.00372
(.0017) (.0004)
Over 49 .0257 .0021
(.0014) (.0004)
(Self-Others)×2014 -.0002 -.0002 -.0003 -.0002 .0031 .0187
(.0010) (.0010) (.0010) (.0010) (.0015) (.0107)
R2 .005 .687 .015 .687 .010 .183
N 779,002 779,002 779,002 779,002 738,182 40,820
Note: Columns 1-6 include zip code xed eects. Panels are balanced and standard errors clustered at
the zip code level. All zip codes corresponding to a P.O. Box are dropped. Individuals younger than 18
(older than 49) are dened as Under 18 (Over 49). Columns 5 and 6 give the results after restricting
the data to cold-list and warm-list donors, respectively.
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Table A.8: Donation: 2013-2014 (Zip Mismatch Only)
Full Data Cold List Warm List
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2014 .9810 .9810 .9166 .9492 1.595 -9.817
(.2403) (.2403) (.2375) (.2380) (.1575) (3.332)
Others×2014 .1700 .1700 .1787 .1743 -.0550 3.072
(.6612) (.6612) (.6575) (.6594) (.5647) (5.921)
Self×2014 .9505 .9506 .9508 .9507 .4547 9.645
(.6935) (.6935) (.6899) (.6917) (.3675) (9.602)
Donor 2013 99.908 99.5643
(6.576) (6.550)
Female 2.813 -.2855
(.4828) (.2836)
Under 18 -3.845 -1.151
(.7308) (.4125)
Over 49 3.926 1.938
(.5322) (.4867)
(Self-Others)×2014 .4846 .7804 .7720 .7763 .5098 6.573
(.8237) (.7916) (.8908) (.8934) (.6359) (10.249)
R2 .005 .184 .009 .184 .003 .045
N 105,440 105,440 105,440 105,440 100,064 5,376
Note: Columns 1-6 include zip code xed eects. Panels are balanced and standard errors clustered
at the zip code level. The sample is restricted to individuals for which their 2014 mailing zip code did
not match their physical zip code. Individuals younger than 18 (older than 49) are dened as Under
18 (Over 49). Columns 5 and 6 give the results after restricting the data to cold-list and warm-list
donors, respectively.
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Table A.9: Propensity to Donate: 2013-2014 (Zip Mismatch Only)
Full Data Cold List Warm List
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2014 -.0006 -.0006 -.0009 -.0006 .0189 -.3597
(.0011) (.0011) (.0011) (.0011) (.0013) (.0222)
Others×2014 .0018 .0018 .0019 .0019 -.0011 .0179
(.0015) (.0015) (.0015) (.0015) (.0029) (.0269)
Self×2014 .0005 .0005 .0005 .0005 -.0013 .0248
(.0024) (.0024) (.0024) (.0024) (.0028) (.0264)
Donor 2013 .8247 .8232
(.0056) (.0057)
Female .0300 .0044
(.0023) (.0008)
Under 18 -.0253 -.0030
(.0031) (.0009)
Over 49 .0191 .0027
(.0027) (.0010)
(Self-Others)×2014 -.0013 -.0014 -.0014 -.0014 -.0002 .0196
(.0023) (.0022) (.0023) (.0023) (.0036) (.0232)
R2 .009 .680 .018 .680 .013 .215
N 105,440 105,440 105,440 105,440 100,064 5,376
Note: Columns 1-6 include zip code xed eects. Panels are balanced and standard errors clustered
at the zip code level. The sample is restricted to individuals for which their 2014 mailing zip code did
not match their physical zip code. Individuals younger than 18 (older than 49) are dened as Under
18 (Over 49). Columns 5 and 6 give the results after restricting the data to cold-list and warm-list
donors, respectively.
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